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Is Imminence Really Necessity? Reconciling
Traditional Self-defense Doctrine With The
Battered Woman Syndrome
Several years have now elapsed since I first became aware
that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false
opinions for true, and then consequently what I afterwards
based on such principles was highly doubtful; and from that
time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once
in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted,
and of commencing anew the work of building from the
foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding
superstructure in the sciences)
INTRODUCTION

When a theory yields results that seem counter-intuitive, the theory itself
must be examined in order to determine if it is the theory or our intuition that
is flawed. Recent cases attempting to reconcile the Battered Woman
Syndrome and self-defense law raise this question. This paper will examine
self-defense law, particularly its imminence requirement, in an attempt to
determine whether self-defense doctrine is flawed in a fundamental way.
The application of traditional self-defense law to situations where
battered victims have killed their attacker has proven problematic and resulted
in a lack of uniformity regarding the disposition of these cases.2 Since the late
1970s,3 courts have been forced to deal with the question of whether and how
the Battered Woman Syndrome can be used in a defense when a battered
victim kills her abuser.4 Many courts have refused to give a self-defense
instruction to the jury in these cases when the killing occurred in a non-

1. RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ONTHE FIRSTPHILOSOPHY, in THE RATIONAUSTS
97, 112 (John Veitch trans., Anchor Books 1974).
2. Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Christine W. Sigman, Reexamining the Doctrine of Self
Defense to Accommodate Battered Women, 18 Am. J. CRIM. L. 169, 181 (1991) ("Since the
circumstances surrounding a battered woman's plea of self defense do not always fit within
traditional notions, a great disparity is present in the treatment of these women in the legal

system. Some women are never indicted. Others are found guilty of everything from
manslaughter to first-degree murder. Some are acquitted.").
3. Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NoTRE DAME

J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 321, 322 (1992).
4. See infra Part III for a description of the Battered Woman Syndrome.
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confrontational situation and the danger was consequently not imminent.5
Other courts have admitted evidence of past abuse to help the jury assess the
reasonableness of a battered woman's belief that harm was imminent in the
context of a traditional self-defense claim,6 and some legislatures have
codified this view.7 Another approach is to allow Battered Woman Syndrome
evidence to support an insanity defense.' Such evidence has also been
accepted when the defendant interposes duress as a defense to other types of
charges.' Commentators have similarly recommended different approaches
to the question of whether, and how, to use this sort of evidence. Scholars
have criticized traditional self-defense law as being gender biased.'0
Conversely, the application (or misapplication) of the law, rather than its
substance, has been found to be the problem." When a theory seems
incapable of dealing with situations for which it was purportedly developed,
a reexamination of the theory is warranted. Circumstances near the fringe of
a theory's scope typically reveal weaknesses, for theories are designed to deal
with the ordinary situations for which they have been crafted. 2 The inability
5. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1988); State v. Norman, 378
S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 750 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
"imminent" as "impending, on the point of happening," "[s]omething which is threatening to
happen at once.").
6. See, e.g., State v. Thibeaux, 366 So.2d 1314, 1317 (La. 1978) (construing the
admission of such evidence to be a question of relevancy); People v. Erickson, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d
740, 745 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding such evidence relevant to determine the reasonableness of
the defendant's belief in both self-defense and imperfect self-defense cases).
7. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-203 (Michie) (allowing the introduction ofexpert
testimony concerning the Battered Woman Syndrome "to establish the necessary requisite belief
of an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm as an element of the affirmative defense,
to justify the person's use of force."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (West 1998).
8. OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. § 2945.392; see also Neelley v. State, 642 So.2d 494, 507
(Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (listing duress, insanity, diminished capacity and mitigation as four
issues where evidence that the defendant suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome would be
relevant).
9. United States v. Marenghi, 893 F.Supp. 85,96 (D. Me 1995); but see United States
v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting evidence regarding the Battered Woman
Syndrome because duress calls for an objective determination of whether a "person of
reasonable firmness would have succumbed to the level of coercion present in a given set of
circumstances").
10. Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 177 ("A battered woman starts at a disadvantage
whenever the right to self defense arises because the concept is grounded in a masculine model.
11. Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-defense: Myths and Misconceptions
in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 383 (1991) (concluding "that the most
common impediments to fair trials for battered women are the result not of the structure or
content of existing law but of its application by trial judges").
12. See WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, LABYRINTHS OF REASON 30-31 (1988). An example
of this phenomenon can be found in early confirmation of the theory of relativity. Nineteenth
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of traditional self-defense law's to handle situations where a victim kills a
batterer in a non-confrontational situation in a manner that is morally and
intuitively acceptable suggests that a look at its theoretical underpinnings is
appropriate. This comment will focus on whether imminence is a necessary
condition in a claim of self-defense or if there are other legitimate ways to
prove that a killing was necessary such that we, as a society, would consider
3
it justified.'
Professor Richard Rosen addressed this question and concluded that
4
"imminence has no significance independent of the notion of necessity."'
Imminence, according to Professor Rosen, is a "translator" for necessity,
which is to say that imminence is a way in which we determine if an action is,
truly necessary." Imminence is a "condition precedent for a finding of
necessity."' 6 Professor Rosen further argues that when imminence and
necessity conflict, imminence must give way, for the whole purpose of making7
an inquiry regarding imminence is to determine if an action was necessary.'
In certain situations, a jury would receive a self-defense instruction with
necessity replacing imminence as the condition that would justify the
homicide.' This approach is sensible, yet it may seem quite drastic as
imminence has been an integral part of an assertion of self-defense for so long.
Professor Rosen proposes to limit the situations where necessity replaces
imminence by placing the burden of production on the defendant to present
evidence that the killing was necessary despite the lack of an imminent threat

century astronomers had been able to determine Neptune's approximate location from
measuring irregularities in Uranus' orbit and estimating, using Newtonian physics, where
another planet might be located that would cause such irregularities. These astronomers could
have achieved the same result using relativity theory. Mercury also exhibited orbital
irregularities, and some astronomers attempted to use these to calculate the location of an
unknown planet using Newtonian physics much the same way as their predecessors had with
Neptune. They were, of course, unsuccessful, yet the irregularities remained. General relativity
accounts for these deviations. The key is Mercury's proximity to the Sun; the differences
between relativity and Newton's gravity only arise in an intense gravitational field, and in this
context, relativity is confirmed while Newtonian theory fails. Like Mercury's orbit, the Battered
Woman Syndrome is evidence that the theory of self-defense sought to be applied to it is flawed.
Id.
13. The reasonability of the defendant's beliefand the requirement that an attack be met
with proportionate force are also problematic when a defendant attempts to invoke the doctrine
of self-defense in a non-confrontational situation and introduce evidence ofthe Battered Woman
Syndrome; however these concerns are beyond the scope of this paper.
14. Richard A. Rosen, On Self.Defense, Imminence, And Women Who Kill Their
Batterers,71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 380 (1993).
15. Id. See infra note 20.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
at 405.
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before such an instruction would be given.19 If imminence, however, is merely
a "translator" for necessity, there is no reason for it to retain its dominant
position in self-defense jurisprudence.2"
This comment will accept Professor Rosen's analysis of the relationship
between imminence and necessity as a starting point. After reviewing
traditional imminence based self-defense law, other doctrines will be
examined which indicate that there is more to necessity than merely
imminence. These doctrines will be compared and certain principles will
emerge. Finally, these principles will be applied to a claim of necessity
arising in the context of a non-confrontational killing by a battering victim.
I. TRADmONAL SELF-DEFENSE LAW STANDARDS

Traditional self-defense doctrine has been crafted with three distinct
principles in mind: necessity, proportionality, and reasonable belief.2" To
justify a use of force, such force must be necessary to prevent the harm sought
to be inflicted.2 2 Proportionality requires that the force used in defense not be
excessive compared to the harm threatened to be inflicted.23 The reasonablebelief requirement means that this defense is available only if the defendant
subjectively believes the proportional force is necessary and that this belief is
objectively reasonable. While these principles provide the theoretical basis
for the doctrine, certain qualifications have been developed which guide their
application in various jurisdictions.
Before examining these qualifying principles, a definition of necessity
should be developed. "Necessity", in common vernacular, is used to signify
two distinct but related sets of circumstances. The first sense that "necessity"
is used in is unconditional. In this sense, necessity is defined as "absolute
physical necessity or inevitability."'2 Alternatively, "necessity" connotes a
conditional, means-ends relationship. In this sense it means "something which
in the accomplishment of a given object cannot be dispensed with.... 26 The
latter definition is applicable to self-defense law, for it is always possible that

19. Id. at 405, 406.
20. "Translator" is probably not the best term to use to describe the relationship
between imminence and necessity. The more familiar term "test" would seem to be a better
choice. When a defendant responds to an attack and the circumstances make the harm sought
to be inflicted imminent, the defendant's response is then necessary.
21. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMiNALLAW 199-200 (1995).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 1029 (6th ed. 1990).
26. Id.
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the defendant allow the attacker to proceed unopposed and kill or severely
harm the defendant. Necessity is thus relative to the interest sought to be
protected, that is, an action is necessary in the self-defense context to the
extent that the harm sought to be avoided would occur absent the defensive

act.2 A second characteristic of necessity is that options that are available to
achieve the desired result have been reduced to one.2" Third, as a corollary
not inherent in the definition of necessity itself, is that the situation requiring

the use of defensive force must have been brought about by the person against

whom it is sought to be used.29 This definition describes necessity in its pure
form; however, many jurisdictions have modified this principle in some way.
One such modifying principle is that a defendant who is the initial
aggressor is not allowed to put forward a claim of self-defense. ° Aggressor
is defined as one whose "affirmative unlawful act [is] reasonably calculated
to produce an affray foreboding injurious or fatal consequences."'" This
principle is often attributed to the idea that one seeking to invoke the doctrine
of self-defense must be free from fault.32 Thus, this qualification seems to be
based on moral considerations to some extent. 33 Another way to view this
requirement is as a recognition that, in situations where the defendant is the
initial aggressor, the killing done is not truly necessary. In other words, the
defendant could have chosen at an earlier time a course of action that would
have allowed him to avoid killing the victim. 4 For the purposes of this paper,

27. See Anthony J. Sebok, Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense Demand Too
Much?, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 725,726-27 (1996) ("A self-defense rule has two tasks: (1) it must
identify the harms to him or herself that a citizen may protect through deadly force, and (2) it
must set out a test for recognizing when deadly force may be used to protect those interests.");
Professor Sebok also suggests as a solution for the problem a battered woman faces in
introducing evidence of the syndrome that we could broaden the definition of harm sufficient
to allow one to respond with deadly force. Id. at 753-54.
28. Cf Arthur Ripstein, Self-Defense and Equal Protection, 57 U. Prrr.L. REV. 685,
686-87 (1996); actually, other options could potentially be available as long as those chosen are
the least drastic available.
29. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (allowing one to use force "for the purpose of
protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present
occasion.") (emphasis added); See also infra section IV.D.
30. DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 201.
31. Id. (quoting United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
32. Id.
33. See Cammack v. State, 261 N.E.2d 862, 865 (Ind. 1970) (stating that Indiana law
requires a defendant to be "without fault" as a condition for the use of self-defense).
34. See State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504, 509-10 (Me. 1971) ("Self-defense is grounded
on necessity and one cannot provoke a difficulty, thus creating a necessity, and then justify the
resulting homicide as an act of necessity inself-defense ....
The law of self-defense is designed
to afford protection to one who is beset by an aggressor and confronted by a necessity not of his
own making.").
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it is important to note that such a modification of the necessity requirement
has nothing to do with imminence. Rather the concern addressed here seems
to be one of causation.35 Thus, in the rules regarding aggressors, there is an
implicit recognition that there is something more than imminence inherent in
the concept of necessity.
Another doctrine that some jurisdictions use to qualify their law of selfdefense is the duty to retreat.' Like the rule against aggressors claiming selfdefense, the retreat rule also acknowledges that necessity is a broader concept
than its equation with imminence would hold. This doctrine requires that a
person retreat, if it is possible to do so in complete safety, before one is
allowed to use deadly force in response to an attack." The duty to retreat
arises because, by definition, if one can take some action other than using
deadly force to avert threatened harm, the use of deadly force is not
necessary." Thus, the retreat rule is built upon the principle of necessity.39
Furthermore, the retreat rule recognizes that there may be circumstances
beyond the temporal which would allow one to retreat.' These additional
circumstances can perhaps best be categorized as spatial.4 Again, in the
retreat rules, there is a recognition that imminence is not all there is to
necessity.
Finally, many jurisdictions impose some sort of temporal requirement
regarding the proximity of the harm sought to be inflicted and the act taken by
the defendant to prevent that harm.42 Typical formulations of a temporal
requirement include "imminent", "immediately necessary" and "on the present

35.

That causation as involved here would explain the moral import explicit in some

analyses of these situations; see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
36. DRBSSLER,supra note 21, at 203-04 (the majority view is to not require retreat, even

if it can be done safely, in the face of an unlawful deadly attack).
37. Id. at 204. Most jurisdictions do not require retreat if one isattacked inone's home.
Id. at 205. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) ("The use of deadly force is not
justifiable.., if... the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with
complete safety by retreating. .. ").

38.

Cf. DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 203.

39. See State v. Abbott, 174 A.2d 881, 884 (NJ. 1961) ("Self-defense is measured
against necessity. From that premise one could readily say there was no necessity to kill in selfdefense if the use of deadly force could have been avoided by retreat.") (citations omitted).

40. DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 204 (there is no requirement to retreat "unless there

is a place of complete safety to which the non-aggressor can turn.") (emphasis in original).
41. See infra section V.B.

42. This comment will use the term imminent in analyzing the question of what the

appropriate standard is for a defendant to be able to use self-defense as a defense; however, any
criticism of imminence as a condition to finding necessity applies generally to any attempt to

temporally qualify the principle of necessity.
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' These restrictions, as a matter of law,
occasion."43
limit the situations where
a jury will be allowed to assess available evidence in the context of a selfdefense instruction." Whatever formulation such qualifiers take, they serve
as a direct limitation on when an act, taken in self-defense, can be found to be
necessary.43 The three principles discussed in the last three paragraphs all
serve to limit the availability of an assertion of self-defense, and the
differences between them, though one of degree, have significant effects in the
application of self-defense law.' This lack of uniformity leading to varying
results suggests that something is amiss.47 Necessity clearly has a temporal
component, and that is what is reflected in the imminence requirement. The
question to be decided is whether self-defense laws that limit necessity in this
manner are conceptually sound or if imminence is merely one factor that
should be taken into account in assessing whether a use of deadly force in selfdefense is necessary."'

43. 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES § 13 1(c) (1984) (this section
provides a list ofjurisdictions using the various formulations).
44. See Rosen supra note 14, at 380.
45. Id. "At trial level imminence operates as a condition precedent for a finding of
necessity. The legislature, or in common-law jurisdictions, the appellate courts, have made an
a priori decision that a killing to prevent a non-imminent threatened harm cannot in any case
be a necessary killing, and the jury (or judge in a bench trial) must decide guilt or innocence in
light of this determination." Id.
46. See Maguigan supra note 11, at 414-16 (finding that jurisdictions that use
"imminent" as opposed to "immediate" are more likely to instruct the jury that evidence of a
decedent's past violence is relevant to evaluating the defendant's state of mind at the time of the
killing). But see ROBINSON, supra note 43, § 13 1(c) (arguing that "immediately necessary" is
a broader standard than "imminent").
47. One could argue that the difference in treatment that defendants in different
jurisdictions experience in these situations was merely a matter of various legislatures
expressing different judgments about what constitutes necessity in the context of a self-defense
claim. The purpose of this comment is, however, to question whether placing a universal
temporal restriction on necessity is ever sound. This differing treatment is pointed out solely
as evidence that there may be a conceptual problem with the overall doctrine.
48. ROBINSON, supra note 43, § 131(c); cf.Rosen, supra note 14, at 382-88 (Professor
Rosen provides a historical analysis of the imminence requirement and concludes that "the
imminence requirement does not have an unquestioned historical lineage as a fundamental
requirement for a finding of self-defense." Self-defense, according to Rosen, "has two historical
roots in early common law." The first, se defendendo, involved a killing taken to defend oneself
after a sudden argument had broken out. The sudden argument requirement may have made an
imminence requirement redundant. Se defendendo was not truly a defense, for the defendant
was incarcerated and a king's pardon was required to spare his life. It was rather more a finding
by the jury that the defendant had acted in self-defense. The second involved killing to prevent
certain felonies, although not murder, and contained no imminence requirement, only a showing
of necessity. Imminence requirements did not appear until later when these two doctrines
merged into the doctrine of self-defense).
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11. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Some may wonder whether any change in self-defense doctrine is
necessary or even desirable. The answer to that question has two parts. First,
it is necessary to assess whether there is a problem with the way that these
laws are written. To do so, it is worthwhile to examine some cases involving
the Battered Woman Syndrome that apply the doctrine. If the results turn out
to be counter-intuitive, it is an indication that the doctrine is flawed. Second,
the problem should manifest itself as more than an occasional anomaly in the
application of the law. If these problems occur only in rare and atypical cases,
little reason exists to change an otherwise successful doctrine.
In order to assess this problem properly, it is necessary to have a general
understanding of the Battered Woman Syndrome.49 The Syndrome is classed
as a sub-category of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 0 Most abusive
relationships go through a three-part cycle.5 ' The first phase is the tension
building phase. 2 During this phase, minor abusive incidents occur which both
parties seek to control, and, ultimately, the tension builds and the syndrome
moves to the second phase. 3 The second phase is that of an acute battering
incident.5 4 The abuse becomes more severe during this phase." Most injuries
occur at this time. 6 The third phase is a "period of loving-contrition or
absence of tension."" This third phase "often revives and reinforces a
battered woman's hopes that her mate may reform and thus keeps her
emotionally attached to the relationship."" In cases where the violence has
59
become extreme, the third phase may not be apparent. As the Syndrome
6°
progresses, the cycle repeats and assaults become more frequent and severe.

49.

See LENORE E.A. WALKER,THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); LENORE E.A. WALKER,

50.

See Walker, supra note 3, at 327.

THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984).

51. Id. at 330.
52. Id.
53. Steele & Sigman, supranote 2, at 170.
54. Walker, supra note 3, at 330.
55. Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1574, 1579 (1993) (citing Lenore E. Walker et al., Beyond the Juror'sKen: Battered
Women, 7 VT. L. REV. 1, 6 (1982)).
56. Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 171 (citing Lenore E. Walker et al., Beyond the
Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REV. 1, 6 (1982)).
57. Walker, supra note 3, at 330.
58. Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 Harv. L.
Rev. 1574, 1579 (1993).
59. Walker, supra note 3, at 330.
60. Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 171.
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As a consequence of this cycle, the victim develops what Dr. Walker
refers to as "learned helplessness." ' This theory "attempts to demonstrate
how a seemingly normal functioning woman loses the ability to predict that
what she does will have an impact upon her safety."' 2 Dr. Walker found
certain factors of adult battering relationships to be correlative of the
development of learned helplessness. 3 This condition makes it likely that a
battered woman will not attempt to leave the situation that she is in." From
a self-defense standpoint, learned helplessness explains why the battered
victim simply did not leave the relationship before resorting to using deadly

force.'5

A. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME CASES DECIDED UNDER TRADITIONAL SELFDEFENSE STANDARDS6

Two cases' 7 in particular have been the source of much scholarly debate
concerning the relationship between the Battered Woman Syndrome, selfdefense and the concept of imminence -- in fact, it is difficult to do even a
modicum of reading on this subject without encountering them. Both cases
have a tendency to leave one uncomfortable with the rulings the two courts

61. Walker supra note 3, at 330.
62. Id. Dr. Walker summarizes an experiment where participants were subjected to
"random and variable adverse stimulation." "Sometimes the participants' behavioral responses
made a difference to what happened while other times they did not. This created the condition
of non-contingency between response and outcome which then taught the participants not to
trust their own natural responses when under threat of danger." (see MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN,
HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT AND DEATH (1975) for the experiment).
63. Walker, supra note 3, at 331 ("The seven factors which predicted the development
of learned helplessness from an abusive adult relationship included (1) violence occurring in
a pattern which included escalation over time and the cycle of violence, (2) sexual abuse within
the context of the relationship, (3) power and control variables such as the batterers'
intrusiveness, over-possessiveness, isolation and jealousy, (4) threats to kill the woman and/or
others, (5) psychological torture including waking her in the middle of the night or not letting
her sleep by forcing her to listen to long harangues, verbal degradation, humiliation and putdowns, monopolization of her perceptions and isolation, attempts at mind control, and
occasional indulgences, (6) violence correlates such as abuse against other people, abuse against
children, abuse against pets and violence against objects, and (7) abuse of alcohol and drugs").
64. DRESSLER, supra note 21, 218.
65. Id.
66. Battered Woman Syndrome testimony has been admitted in a variety of
circumstances, and this comment does not mean to imply otherwise. See infra Part I. Rather,
as the purpose of this comment is to evaluate the imminence requirement of a self-defense claim,
those cases where this requirement has served as a bar to the admission of such evidence are of
particular interest.
67. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan.

1988).
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ultimately made. Using these results of these cases as evidence, a res ipsa
loquitur-like" argument emerges. Something must be wrong with the doctrine
that leads to such counter-intuitive results.6 9 Although these cases are familiar
to many, for the purpose of providing this evidence, the facts and holdings of
these two cases will be given in detail.
Perhaps the best known case where the imminence requirement served
as a bar to a claim of self-defense being made by a battering victim is State v.
Norman.7 ° In this case, the defendant, Mrs. Norman, presented evidence
showing a history of abuse by her alcoholic husband spanning almost twenty
years. 7' The physical portion of the abuse inflicted upon her by Mr. Norman
"included slapping, punching and kicking her, striking her with various
72
objects, and throwing glasses, beer bottles and other objects at her.
Additional incidents of abuse included "her husband putting out cigarettes on
her, throwing hot coffee on her, breaking glass against her face and crushing
food on her face., 73 He also forced her to engage in prostitution and would
beat her if she resisted doing so or if he felt she did not make enough money. 74
He often called her "'dog', 'bitch' and 'whore."' 7 5 He forced her to eat pet
food from pet bowls, to bark like a dog and frequently to sleep on the floor.76
Mrs. Norman attempted to leave on several occasions, but her husband "had
always found her, brought her home and beat her. 7 7 The defendant's husband
also repeatedly threatened to kill her.78
In the days immediately prior to the killing, the abuse inflicted upon the
defendant escalated.7 9 Mr. Norman was arrested for driving while impaired
as he was returning home in the early morning from a rest area where he had
gone to assault the defendant.8" The following evening, police were called to
the Norman"s residence and the defendant told them that Mr. Norman had
been beating her all day."' She stated that she was afraid to fill out a

68.
69.
there is no
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

79.
80.
81.

Or reductio ad absurdum, if one is of a philosophic bent.
Of course, if one considers the resulting convictions in these cases to be just, then
problem with the doctrine that produces them.
378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989).

Id.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 10.

Id.

State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989).
Id.
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complaint against him, and the police left.82 They were summoned back later
after the defendant consumed a bottle of pills.8 3 Mr. Norman obstructed
paramedics that were tending to his wife until a police officer intervened. 4
The following day Mrs. Norman went to a mental health center to discuss the
possibility of filing charges against her husband and having him committed.85
When she told her husband what she was contemplating, he said that he would
"'see them coming' and would cut her throat before they got to him."86
' Mrs.
Norman also went to social services that day to obtain welfare benefits, but
Mr. Norman "followed her there, interrupted her interview and made her go
'
home with him."87
After they returned home, Mr. Norman "continued his
abuse of her, threatening to kill and to maim her, slapping her, kicking her,
and throwing objects at her."88 He also put out a cigarette on her.8 9 He
refused to let her eat or to get food for their children.9° Later that evening, Mr.
Norman went to bed and made the defendant lie on the floor by the bed.9 One
of their children brought her baby to sleep with the defendant. 92 When the
baby started to cry, Mrs. Norman took it to her mother's house to keep it from
waking her husband.93 Mrs. Norman took a pistol from her mother's house,
returned to her home and shot Mr. Norman three times in the back of the head
while he was sleeping. 94
At trial, two expert witnesses testified that Mrs. Norman fit within the
profile of the Battered Woman Syndrome.9 5 One stated that, in his opinion,
Mrs. Norman believed she had no choice other than to use deadly force
against her husband. 96 The trial court refused to allow the jury to consider the
question of self-defense, and Mrs. Norman was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter. 97 The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed, holding that a
self-defense instruction is not required unless the defendant introduces
evidence "tending to show that at the time of the killing the defendant
82.
83.

Id. at 11.

85.

Id.

84.
86.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.

State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 1989).

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.

94.

State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id. at9.

96.
97.

State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 1989).
Id. at 9.

93.

95.

Id. atll.
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reasonably believed herself to be confronted by circumstances which
necessitated her killing her husband to save herself from imminent death or
great bodily harm.""'
The Supreme Court of Kansas confronted a similar situation in State v.
Stewart." In this case, the trial court gave a self-defense instruction to the
jury and the defendant was acquitted."" The State, however, appealed the
question of whether the giving of a self-defense instruction was appropriate
in this case."' The Kansas Supreme Court found that "[iun order to instruct
a jury on self-defense, there must be some showing of an imminent threat or
a confrontational circumstance involving an overt act by an aggressor.""
Absent a showing of an imminent threat, a sufferer of the Battered Woman
Syndrome is not entitled to plead self-defense.
As in Norman, a long history of abuse was also present in the Stewart
case involving both the defendant and her children.'
Mike and Peggy
Stewart had been married for about twelve years at the time of the killing"
Shortly after their marriage, Mike began abusing Peggy by hitting and kicking
her."0 Peggy was hospitalized for psychological problems, and after she was
released, Mike would encourage her to take more of her medication than was
prescribed." Peggy received reports from social workers that Mike was
sexually abusing her twelve year old daughter, and Mike would taunt her that
her daughter "was 'more of a wife' to him than Peggy."' ' When the daughter
was placed in a detention center, Mike forbade Peggy to visit her. '° When the
daughter returned home in the summer, Mike "forced her, [the daughter,] to
sleep in an un-air conditioned room with the windows nailed shut, to wear a
heavy flannel nightgown, and to cover herself with heavy blankets.""' 9 He
then would wake the daughter at 5:30 a.m. and force her to do all the
household chores."" Later, the daughter, still in her teens, was thrown out of

98.
99.
100.

Id. at 12.

104.

State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 574-75 (Kan. 1988).

763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988).

101.
102.
103.

Id. at 574.
Id.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 574.

105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 574.
Id.
Id.
Id.

109.
110.

State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 574 (Kan. 1988).

Id.

2000]

IMMINENCE AND THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME

was in Colorado, but Mike
the house by Mike."' The family later heard she
2
her."
contact
and
try
to
Peggy
allow
to
refused
Mike repeatedly threatened to kill Peggy, holding a gun to her head
several times." 3 One Christmas, "Mike threw the turkey dinner to the floor,
chased Peggy outside, grabbed her by the hair, rubbed her face in the dirt, and
then kicked and beat her.""' 4 He once kicked her in the ribs hard enough to
require hospitalization." 5 On another occasion, he came to the restaurant
where Peggy was working and ran the customers off with a gun because he
wanted Peggy to come home and have sex with him." 6 Another time, Mike
woke Peggy by beating her with a baseball bat." 7 He also shot one of Peggy's
cats and then pointed the gun at her head and threatened to shoot."'
The killing was precipitated by an attempt by Peggy to get away from
20
Her
Mike." 9 She left and fled to her daughter's home in another state.
2'
suicidal.'
was
she
because
hospital
a
to
admitted
her
daughter had
Subsequently, Mike called and said he was coming to get her and she agreed
to return with him. 2 2 He told her that he would kill her if she ever left him
again. 2 3 When they arrived home, "Mike forced Peggy into the house and
forced her to have oral sex several times."'' Peggy found a loaded pistol the
5
next morning and hid it in a spare room because she was afraid of it.' As she
did housework that morning, Peggy testified, "Mike kept making remarks that
she should not bother because she would not be there long, or that she should
26
not bother with her things because she could not take them with her."' Later
27
that day, Mike again forced Peggy to perform oral sex. They went to bed
that night about 8:00p.m. and after Mike had fallen asleep, Peggy got the gun
from the spare bedroom and killed him. 28 At trial, the defense introduced

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 574-75.
State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 575 (Kan. 1988).
Id. at 574.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Id.
State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 575 (Kan. 1988).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 575 (Kan. 1988).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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expert testimony that Peggy suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome.' 29 The
defense's expert testified that "loaded guns, veiled threats, and increased

1 She
sexual demands are indicators of the escalation of the cycle."' 30
believed
that Peggy "had a repressed knowledge that she was in a 'really grave lethal
3
situation.""
These two courts' holdings, that a self-defense instruction will not be

given absent an imminent threat, are unsettling, particularly when, despite the
lack of such a threat, the defendants' responses appear to be the only way to
avoid the harm sought to be inflicted upon them. In other words, the two
defendant"s actions were necessary to avoid the harm.' 32 The trial court and

jury in Stewart apparently felt self-defense was appropriate in that case, for

the court gave the self-defense instruction and the jury acquitted the
defendant.' The widespread granting of executive clemency in Norman and
similar cases indicates that many governors must have felt results like these

were unjust.

34

It is difficult to precisely articulate reasons for the discomfort

many feel with these results.

35

For the purposes of this argument, it is enough

129. State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 576 (Kan. 1988).
130. Id.; see infra Part III for a description of the cycle referred to.
131. State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d at 576.
132. See Rosen supra note 14, at 404-05 (Jury instructions would include a necessity
requirement, and juries in cases like this would still have to find necessity before concluding
that the defendant's use of deadly force was justified).
133. State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 574 (Kan. 1988).
134. See Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence (pt. 5), 106
HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1590 (1993). "Some of these convicted women are now making headlines
throughout the country, as governors in at least eight states have granted clemency to thirtyeight women." Id.; see also Rosen supra note 14, at 391 n.56 (Ms. Norman's sentence was
commuted to time served after she spent two months in prison) (citing Mark Barrett, Norman
Set Free, AsHEviLLE CruzEN-TNEs, July 8, 1989, at 1.).
135. See David McCord and Sandra K. Lyons, MoralReasoning and the CriminalLaw:
The Example of Self-defense, 30 Am.CRIM. L. REV. 97, 110-11 (1992). In analyzing the
Norman case, the authors found the following:
There are at least ten significant facts which our common sense and life
experience tell us are highly significant in this case but which seem not
to be considered by the traditional law. In no particular order these ten
are: (1)J.T. [Mr. Norman] and Judy [Mrs. Norman] were not equally
matched in terms of physical prowess, as J.T. apparently was significantly
more powerful; (2) Judy was distraught because of the actions of J.T.; (3)
Judy's mental state was colored not merely by one single incident of
abuse, but by the culmination of twenty years of abuse; (4) Because J.T.
lived in the same house as Judy, he had virtually constant access to her to
inflict abuse on her; (5) Having Judy at his disposal in this manner, J.T.
was thus able to decide when, where, and how to inflict the abuse---he
took advantage of the option which the law apparently ceded to him to
launch nondeadly attacks on her at his whim, without fear of a justifiable
deadly response; (6) Judy's future was bleak---there was no basis for her
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that the results run counter to the outcome that many would regard to be just.
Given this uneasiness, a close look at the alternatives some commentators
have proposed 3 6 is warranted, and consideration should be given to taking
these approaches seriously.
B. IS THE PROBLEM OF SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE TO WARRANT A CHANGE IN
SELF-DEFENSE LAW?

There are two ways of looking at the magnitude of the problem, and
consequently, two answers emerge. First, and in the more limited sense, the
question is whether the imminence principle acts as an irrational obstacle to
a claim of self-defense in situations where a battered victim has killed an
attacker in circumstances that appear necessary. Second, the issue is whether
self-defense law is inherently flawed in a very basic sense regardless of the
particular situation to which it is applied. If it is flawed in this manner, then
unjust results may follow in a variety of types of cases which are difficult to
foresee.
Evidence regarding the Battered Woman Syndrome has been admitted
in many cases for various reasons. 3 7 The common assumption that most
killings of a batterer by a battered victim occur in a non-confrontational
setting has been questioned, and it has been argued that the opposite is true. 3 '
In cases where the defendant acted during an immediate confrontation,
imminence does not serve as a bar to a claim of self-defense, for in these
cases, the threatened harm is imminent. Thus, imminence may not, in
practice, have much of an effect on the administration of justice in these cases.

136.

to believe that J.T. would be content to live without her or that he had any
intent to stop abusing her; (7) Judy apparently had no viable alternative
but to stay in the vicinity---she had no job skills to support herself
elsewhere, and her support network was in that community; (8) Judy had
no reasonable prospect of being able to stay in that community outside the
presence of J.T., since he would find her anywhere in the vicinity; (9) The
governmental authorities failed to take any action to protect Judy despite
having been contacted by her; and, (10) J.T.'s actions prevented Judy
from doing anything further to invoke the help of the governmental
authorities. These ignored facts have no place in the moral reasoning
mandated by the traditional law of self-defense, yet they cause us to suffer
moral disquiet with the result.
Id.

See infra Part I for a discussion of Professor Richard Rosen's solution to this

problem; see also ROBINSON, supra note 43, §§ 13 1(c), 132 (1984) (proposing eliminating the
imminence requirement from self-defense law and replacing it with the consideration of whether
the defensive action was necessary).
137. See infra Part I.
138. See Maguigan, supra note 11, at 388-401.
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These considerations, however, are really beside the point. Regardless of the
actual proportions between confrontational and non-confrontational killings
of this sort, there are a significant number of battered victims who do kill in
non-confrontational situations.' 39 If there are a significant number of
defendants who are unfairly disadvantaged by the way the law is constructed,
the presence of another group not so situated is irrelevant. Furthermore, the
problem that this comment addresses is not the plight of battered women who
kill their abusers generally, but whether self-defense law as it exists is
inherently flawed.
The fact that evidence regarding the Battered Woman Syndrome has
been admitted in many cases does not support the conclusion that imminence
does not act as an impediment. In many cases, evidence concerning the
syndrome is admitted to help the jury assess the reasonableness of the
defendant's perceptions while still assessing the defendant's claim in terms of
traditional self-defense law."4 One of those traditional standards is
imminence, of course. If the jury is constrained from finding that the
defensive act was necessary by an instruction incorporating the imminence
standard, the jury is addressing the wrong question. Barring jury nullification,
it is hard to see how a defendant who kills in a non-confrontational situation
can successfully claim self-defense in the face of the imminence
requirement. 4 ' In cases like these, imminence may be improperly impairing
the function of the true principle - necessity - despite the admission of

Battered Woman Syndrome evidence, and when this happens necessity should
prevail. 142 These concerns are not limited to the use of the Battered Woman

139. Rosen supra note 14, at 402-03. "This is the important point in this analysis:
Norman is not the sort of isolated, aberrational incident---like shipwrecked sailors forced to eat
their comrades to save their own lives---that can be relegated safely to executive clemency.
Instead, dozens, perhaps hundreds of women enter the criminal justice system having killed their
batterers in non-confrontational situations." ld.
140. See, e.g., State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 820 n.8 (N.D. 1983); State v.
Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1336 (Ohio 1998) (concerning evidence of the Battered Child
Syndrome); State v. Thibeaux, 366 So.2d 1314,1317-18 (La. 1978); People v. Erickson, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 740, 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375-76 (N.J. 1984).
141. DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 219-20.
142. Rosen supra note 14, at 380-8 1. Professor Rosen points out that this leads to some
anomalous results:
Because imminence serves only to further the necessity principle, if
there is a conflict between imminence and necessity, necessity must
prevail. If action is really necessary to avert a threatened harm, society
should allow the action, or at least not punish it, even if the harm is not
imminent. Conversely, even if the harm is imminent, society should not
permit defensive action if such action is not necessary.
While the criminal law in this country tends to follow the latter
proposition, at least to some degree, it ignores the former. Thus,
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Syndrome, or other such syndromes, in self-defense claims; any criminal
defendant interposing self-defense to a homicide charge could be
disadvantaged, depending on the factual circumstances, by the application of
a flawed doctrine. This problem is of sufficient scope to warrant a
modification of existing doctrine both because it affects a significant group of
criminal defendants and it makes the application of the law irrational.
IV. ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF NECESSITY

Proposals have already been made to modify the role that imminence
plays in assessing whether a defendant's actions constitute self-defense and
are hence justifiable. There are two basic alternatives which would allow a
jury to focus on necessity, rather than imminence, in evaluating a self-defense
claim. One alternative is to eliminate imminence entirely as a condition, and
it would then function as a factor to be considered but would possess no
greater significance than any other relevant factor. 43 A more limited approach
is to allow imminence to retain its normal place but to make provisions for its
elimination in cases where it interferes with the functioning of the necessity
principle.'" Both alternatives may seem unpalatable to some; imminence is
a fairly well-accepted principle in self-defense law. The balance of this
comment will examine other uses the law makes of necessity unbridled by
imminence, other situations where defensive action appears necessary despite
the lack of imminence and make some comparisons of how necessity functions
with and without imminence in an effort to argue that these proposed changes
are not really that dramatic.
A. THE DEFENSE OF NECESSITY IN TORT AND CRIMINAL LAW

Both criminal and tort law recognize a defense or privilege of
necessity. 45 These defenses differ from self-defense in several aspects. Most
notably, it is unclear whether they are available to a defendant who has taken

generally the law requires that a person avoid using force, especially
lethal force, if an alternative to avoiding a threat is available, even if the
threat poses an imminent danger. The law does not, however, allow a
person to use force of any degree to ward off a danger that is not deemed
imminent, no matter how necessary the protective action may be.
Id.
143. See ROBINSON, supra note 43, §§ 13 1(C), 132 (1984).
144. See Rosen, supra note 14, at 404-05 (1993).
145. ROBINSON, supra note 43, § 124; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 196, 197,
262,263 (1965).
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a life."4 Some of these defenses do not prevent ajury from finding that an act

was necessary when the harm sought to be prevented was not imminent.
Although imminence is likely a consideration, in these jurisdictions it is not

a necessary precondition to a finding of necessity. In criminal law, these

defenses are sometimes referred to as lesser evils defenses or choice of evils
defenses.'47

In criminal law, about half of American jurisdictions recognize the

defense of necessity. 4" Many jurisdictions do impose a temporal limitation
on a finding of necessity; however, some do not. 49 The Model Penal Code

contains no requirement that the threatened harm be imminent in its version
of the necessity defense;" 0 however, its version of self-defense modifies the

necessity requirement and makes it "immediately necessary."'' In State v.
Spaulding, a Minnesota court allowed a jury to consider a necessity defense
without instructing the jury on the issue of imminent harm.' The Minnesota
Supreme Court found that the instruction was proper and that it was not
necessary to further define necessity in the jury instruction.' The defendant
was a felon who wrestled a gun away from an attacker and was subsequently

146. Compare DRESSLER, supranote 21 at 270 (arguing that "it is at least plausible that
a court might justify a homicide of an innocent person in necessitous circumstances"), with State
v. Tate, 477 A.2d 462, 465 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (finding that "when deliberate
homicide was involved, (and except for self-defense and defense of another or of one's home)
common law courts did not allow necessity as a justification for the criminal act").
147. ROBINSON, supra note 43, § 124.
148. Id.
149. ROBINSON, supra note 43, § 124(f). Compare Toops v. State, 643 N.E.2d 387, 390
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (setting forth the elements of a necessity defense as: "(1) the act charged
as criminal must have been done to prevent a significant evil; (2) there must have been no
adequate alternative to the commission of the act; (3) the harm caused by the act must not be
disproportionate to the harm avoided; (4) the accused must entertain a good-faith belief that his
act was necessary to prevent greater harm; (5) such belief must be objectively reasonable under
all the circumstances; and (6) the accused must not have substantially contributed to the creation
of the emergency"), with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN § 9.22 (West 1994) ("Conduct is justified if:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm;
(2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, according to ordinary
standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the
conduct; and (3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the conduct does
not otherwise plainly appear.").
150. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02.
151. Id. at § 3.04.
152. State v. Spaulding, 296 N.W.2d 870, 877 (Minn. 1980) (the courts actual
instruction read as follows: "If you find that the defendant obtained a pistol in defense of
himself or another, that is justified and the defendant has not violated the law. However, once
the necessity for his possession is reasonably over he no longer may possess the pistol. It is for
you to determine if continued possession is reasonably justified.").
153. Id.
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convicted of being a felon in possession of a weapon." The jury apparently
found that the defendant's possession of the firearm continued for a period
longer than what was necessary.'"I This case illustrates two important points.
First, courts can and do sometimes allow the jury to consider the question of
whether an act was necessary without forcing them to first determine that a
threat of harm was imminent. Thus, there are some precedents for this
approach to adjudicating the issue of necessity. Second, even absent an
instruction containing an imminence requirement, a jury will consider the
question of necessity and can find that such necessity does not exist. In this
case, the defendant possessed the weapon for no more than fifteen minutes
and surrendered it to the5 7police when they arrived on the scene." The jury
convicted nevertheless.
Tort law, similarly, does not always make imminence an explicit part of
the defense of necessity.'58 The Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts
contains several sections where the concept of necessity is used without
explicitly limiting a finding of necessity to situations involving imminent
threats.' 5 9 At other times, the drafters of the Restatement expressly did
include an imminence requirement, or some other sort of temporal limitation,
as a condition precedent to a finding of necessity. 'I As the drafters explicitly
included a temporal limitation in some sections of the Restatement while not
doing so in others, they must have concluded that imminence is not a
necessary precondition to allow a finding of necessity in all cases and its
inclusion in some sections was more a matter of policy than logical necessity.
The point of this departure into the criminal defense of necessity and the
tort privileges of necessity is twofold. First, it demonstrates that necessity is

154.

Id. at 876.

157.

State v. Spaulding, 296 N.W.2d 870-872-73 (Minn. 1980).

155.
156.
158.

Id.
Id.

But see John P. Finan & John Ritson, Tortious Necessity; The Privileged Defense,

26 AKRON L. REv. 1, 2 (1992) (finding imminence to be a necessary condition of the tort
defense of necessity).

159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 197 (1985) (Private necessity to enter land),
§ 260 (privilege to commit a trespass to chattel or conversion if reasonably necessary to protect
actor's land or chattels), § 261 (privilege to commit a trespass to chattel or conversion if
reasonably necessary to defend actor or a third person), § 262 (privilege to commit a trespass
to chattel or conversion if necessary to avert a public disaster), § 263 (similar privilege created

by private necessity).
160. id. at § 196 ("One is privileged to enter land in the possession of another if it is, or
if the actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of averting an imminent

public disaster"), § 63 (privilege to use non-deadly defensive force to avert harm "that another

is about to inflict intentionally upon him"), § 65 (privilege to use deadly force to avert death or
serious bodily harm another is "about to inflict").
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not logically dependent on imminence. It is possible for a jury to assess the
issue of necessity without explicitly instructing them on imminence, even if
they do consider imminence in making their ultimate determination. Second,
although the approach taken by courts in a majority of self-defense situations
involves an imminence requirement, there are some precedents to support not
constraining the jury in this manner.
B. SPATIAL NECESSITY

Although no case has addressed the issue of whether necessity can arise
to prevent a threatened harm due to spatial rather than temporal
considerations, the question has been the subject of several hypotheticals.' 6'
The requirement that some jurisdictions impose that a defendant retreat if able
to safely do so before using deadly force recognizes spatial elements. 62 This
is a spatial consideration because, if the physical situation is such that there
is a place available to which the defendant can move and avoid the threatened
harm, the use of deadly force is not necessary to avoid it. 63 Keeping the
existence of the retreat rules in mind and what they represent, it is worth
looking at some of the hypotheticals dealing with the issue of spatial
necessity.
The first such hypothetical has been advanced by two scholars with
minor variations." In this situation, the defendant has been kidnapped and
imprisoned by the victim in a very secure cell. 65 The victim announces his
intention to kill the defendant at some point in the future.'6 Each morning,
the victim brings some food and water into the defendant's cell. 6 The
68
defendant's only opportunity to escape occurs during these morning visits.
One morning when his captor enters, several days before the killing is
supposed to take place, the defendant strikes him over the head, killing him,
and escapes.' 69 The question, of course, is whether the intended victim must
wait until the killing is about to take place before he may use deadly force to
defend himself. 7 ° Giving imminence its normal meaning, the defendant's

161. No case, in any event, that I am aware of has addressed this subject.
162. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
163. See infra note 39.
164. SANFORD H. KADISH, CimiNAL LAW AND ITS PRocEssEs 832 (1995); ROBINSON,
supra note 43, § 131(c)(1).
165. KADISH, supra note 164, at 832.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. KADISH, supra note 164, at 832.
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actions would not be justifiable until the threat to his life was about to come
to fruition.7 7 Requiring the defendant to wait until the last moment in this
situation, however, could significantly reduce his chances of success when he
finally attempts to escape. 72 The problem with an imminence based necessity
analysis in this case is that it focuses on the immediacy of the threat rather
than the immediacy of the action necessary to avert the threat. 73 If the harm
cannot be avoided or the risk that the harm will occur will increase if the
intended victim delays action, "the principle of self-defense must permit him
to act earlier - as early as required to defend himself effectively.' 74 Allowing
a jury to evaluate this defendant's actions in terms of necessity rather than
imminence would allow them to acquit on a legal theory that is both consistent
with morality and intuition. If the defendant's acts were not necessary to
avoid the threatened harm, the jury would still be free to convict.",
A second hypothetical problem illustrates similar points. In this
situation, the crew of a passenger ship finds a slow leak in the vessel shortly
after leaving port. 7 The ship's captain refuses to turn back. 77 The leak is
slow enough such that it poses no risk of sinking the vessel for two days.7 ,
May the sailors mutiny now while still close to land or must they wait until
sinking is imminent even though they will be too far out to sea to reach shore

171. ROBINSON, supra note 43, § 131(c)(1).
172. Analogously, a retreat jurisdiction does not require retreat if doing so would
increase the threat to the person acting in self-defense. See DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 204.
173. ROBINSON, supra note 43, § 131 (c)(1).
174. Id.
175. Id. "If the concern of the limitation is to exclude threats of harm that are too remote
to require a response, the problem is adequately handled by requiring simply that the response
be 'necessary."' Id.; Rosen, supra note 14 at 392.
176. ROBINSON, supra note43, § 124(0(1). Robinson raises this hypothetical in
discussing imminence in the context of the necessity or choice of evils defense, where he also
raises the following hypothetical in discussing "immediately necessary" as a modification ofthe
necessity requirement: "Consider the case of the bomb-maker X, whose construction plans
require a ten-day period for building the weapon. Suppose further that the actor, D, knows that
X is going to set off the bomb in a school. He also knows that X's construction plans require
ten days to build the weapon, and that police and other authorities are unavailable to intervene.
Under the simple requirement that the conduct be 'necessary,' the actor could trespass upon X's
property and abort the plan by disabling the bomb at any time, including the first day, as long
as such action was the least drastic means of preventing the project's completion. Under the
'immediately necessary' restriction, the actor would be obliged to wait until the last day,
presumably until the last moment that intervention would still be effective." Id. at § 124(f)(3).
This hypothetical is less compelling than the ship hypothetical because waiting, in this case does
not worsen the actor's situation in the same way that waiting puts the sailors in a more
precarious situation.
177. ROBINSON, supra note 43, § 124(0(1).
178. Id.
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when this occurs? 7' Again, necessity is shown to have non-temporal
components, for it is the worsening of the sailors' position in relation to the
shore rather than the temporal proximity of the harm that is the impetus for
action. The imminence requirement interferes with the proper necessity
analysis that should be made here."8 °
One response to this hypothetical is that the danger actually is already
imminent at the time that the sailors discover the leak. Being forced to travel
into the middle of the ocean in a vessel that is. not seaworthy surely is
extremely risky; however, the threatened harm is not "on the point of
happening.'' In fact the harm may never occur; they may survive despite the
leak either by successfully crossing the ocean or by being picked up later in
a lifeboat. It is worthwhile comparing this hypothetical to Mrs. Norman's
situation. 82 Like the sailors, had Mrs. Norman not taken action when she did,
the harm she sought to avert would have most likely materialized and she
would have been in a worse position to prevent it from occurring. She would
have almost certainly been subject to further abuse at the hands of her
husband, and once he was awake and abusing her, her defensive options
would have been limited and risky.
As is demonstrated by the above two hypotheticals, not only is necessity
a broader concept than imminence would allow, imminence can actually
interfere with the appropriate necessity analysis that should be made in these
situations - an analysis which gives due regard to the spatial elements present.
As imminence is merely a way of measuring necessity, in situations like these
where the two concepts conflict, imminence should not be permitted to
Situations like Mrs. Norman's may contain neither spatial nor
interfere.'
temporal elements from which the necessity of the defensive action arises;
however, this cannot end the analysis of these situations just as an imminence
analysis cannot properly end the inquiry when spatial elements cause the
defensive action to be necessary.

179.

Id.

180. ld.

181. BLACK'S LAWDICrONARY750 (6th ed. 1990). See infra note 5 for a definition of
"imminent."
182. See supra Part III.A for a description of Mrs. Norman's situation.
183. Rosen, supra note 14, at 380 ("If action really is necessary to avert a threatened
harm, society should allow the action, or at least not punish it, even if the harm is not
imminent").
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C. NECESSITY AND BArTERED WOMEN

The question remains from where, in a non-confrontational killing such
as that which occurred in Mrs. Norman's case, does the necessity of the use
of defensive force arise? Necessity has two bases in these situations. First,
learned helplessness,8 4 a characteristic of the Battered Woman Syndrome,
limits a battered victim's ability to act. Second, society's ineffectiveness in
intervening in these situations makes reliance on outside assistance at least
dubious and probably precarious.'8 State v. Norman"6 exemplifies these
principles.
In State v. Norman, the defense presented expert testimony that Mrs.
Norman exhibited the characteristics of the Battered Woman Syndrome,
including learned helplessness.8 7 Learned helplessness results in a loss by the
battering victim of the ability to take steps to protect herself from further
abuse.'
This condition leads to passivity and the inability to realistically
assess danger. 9 Even if an opportunity to escape the situation presents itself,
the victim of the battering may fail to take advantage of it."g This condition
has important implications for the doctrine of self-defense. Necessity entails
a lack of feasible alternatives. If, because of the condition of learned
helplessness, a battering victim is unable to take measures to protect herself
short of using deadly force, the alternative measures are not feasible. 9 '
Furthermore, because learned helplessness occurs as a result of continued
See Walker, supra note 3, at 330.
185. Rosen, supra note 14, at 395 ("The professional literature recently has developed
evidence to support the contention that a woman who is already being battered by an abusive
man, and who tries to leave or get help, is placing her life at risk").
186. 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
187. Id. at 11. The first expert, a forensic psychologist, described the syndrome as
follows: "This condition ... is characterized by such abuse and degradation that the battered
wife comes to believe she is unable to help herself and cannot expect help from anyone else.
She believes she cannot escape the complete control of her husband and that he is invulnerable
to law enforcement and other sources of help. Id. When asked if he believed it appeared
reasonably necessary to Mrs. Norman that she shoot her husband he answered affirmatively. Id.
The second expert testified that Mrs. Norman "was a typical abused spouse and that 'she saw
herself as powerless to deal with the situation, that there was no alternative, no way she could
escape it'." Id. He also agreed that it appeared reasonably necessary to Mrs. Norman that she
take her husband"s life. Id. at 12.
184.

188.
Syndrome,
189.
190.

Victoria Mikesell Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet. The Battered Woman
Self-defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REV. 545, 554 (1988).
Id.

Id.
191. Aside from learned helplessness, practical considerations also make alternative steps
difficult. See Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 172-74 (enumerating the practical difficulties
battering victims face in seeking protection from the police and through restraining and
protective orders).
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abuse by the batterer,' the batterer is responsible for creating the condition.
In other words, the batterer is responsible for creating the situation where his
victim has only one realistic option by making it impossible for the victim to
take other actions to avoid the harm -- to respond with deadly force. The
parallel to traditional self-defense situations is clear; when a threatened harm
is imminent, the attacker has limited his intended victim's choice of action to
one option because that is the only choice available due to temporal
considerations.' 93
A second consideration in determining whether it was necessary for Mrs.
Norman to use defensive force is the fact that she attempted to take other
actions prior to killing her batterer. Mrs. Norman had left Mr. Norman
previously on several occasions; however, "he had always found her, brought
her home and beaten her."' 94 Two days prior to the killing, the police were
twice summoned to the Norman house. 95 The first time they did nothing
because Mrs. Norman was afraid to sign a complaint against her husband.' 96
The second incident occurred less than an hour later after Mrs. Norman took
a bottle of pills.' 97 A police officer chased Mr. Norman back into the house
when he tried to interfere with the paramedics tending to his wife; however,
apparently no other action was taken against him.' On the day of the killing,
Mrs. Norman sought aid at both a mental health center and social services.199
Mr. Norman followed her to social services, interrupted her appointment and
forced her to return home.' The futility of her efforts to leave Mr. Norman
and to obtain outside assistance made her belief that the use of force was
necessary both objectively and subjectively reasonable.2"' Additionally, Mrs.
192.
193.

See Walker, supra note 3, at 330-32.

. unless the attack was seconds away, the
Cf Ripstein, supra note 28, at 697 ("...

accused was presumed to have had other avenues of escape").
194. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 1989).
195. Id. at 10.
196. Id.
197.

Id.

198. Id.
199. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 1989).
200. Id.
201. Society's failure to intervene effectively when given the opportunity is relevant in
assessing a battering victim's options when defensive force is used:
The law has justified violence in the form of self defense for
centuries. Our society has since developed more modem and less violent
means of protection, such as professional law enforcement, injunctions,
and peace bonds. Today public policy favors the use of these modem
alternatives over violence in the name of self defense [sic]. The
availability of these options has contributed to the reluctance of many
courts to recognize self defense [sic] except in the most obvious battered
woman cases. Consequently, the degree to which the legal system

2000]

IMMINENCE AND THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME

Norman's lack of success in these attempts to change her situation probably

reinforced her perception that she was powerless to protect herself, which
relates directly to learned helplessness.2

2

protects a battered woman is central to any application of traditional selfdefense doctrines to her conduct.
Steele & Sigman, supra note2, at 171-72. "How ironic for the legal
system to prosecute a battered woman when the failure of the system to
protect her left her with no real option but to take matters into her own
hands." Id. at 174 (citing Lenore E. Walker et al., Beyond the Juror's
Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REV. 1, 171 n.12 (1982)).
Addressing the issue of why Mrs. Norman simply could not flee,
Professor Rosen, after first noting that on previous occasions Mr. Norman
had tracked, caught and beaten his wife when she attempted to escape and
that such attempts often lead to great danger for battered women, provides
the following analysis:
Even if flight would have been risky for M[r]s. Norman, there was at
least a chance that she could have crept out of town, masked her identity,
and fled to Alaska to establish a new life. One could argue, therefore, that
the killing of her husband was not absolutely necessary. The difficulty
with such an argument is that it is based on an erroneous premise that the
law always requires absolute necessity before granting the privilege of
self-defense.... The possibility always exists that a person attacking
another with a gun will change his mind, or miss, or have a heart attack
before pulling the trigger. If a reasonable person in the situation,
however, would believe that deadly force was needed, the law permits the
use of fatal defensive force. Similarly, the mere possibility of retreat is
not determinative so long as a reasonable person would believe that the
retreat would not provide safety. Take the analysis one step further,
however, and assume that M[r]s. Norman could have escaped safely from
her house and fled to Alaska, where she could change her identity and
live happily, and safely, ever after. If society required her to do this, the
end result most likely would be one less dead body, a result not always
possible when the aggressor is coming after the victim at the moment she
kills in self-defense. The simple answer to this proposition is that society
does not now, nor has it ever, required completely innocent people to
behave in this fashion. No matter how clear it was to Gary Cooper that
somebody would end up dead if he did not leave before the train carrying
the enemy arrived at "High Noon," our culture allows him to stay in town
and affords him the right to kill in self-defense when the bad guys come
after him. Even when retreat is required, which is not all that often, one
must only physically move to a place of temporary safety. Renunciation
of personal and family identity is not demanded.
Rosen, supra note 14, at 392-93, 395-97.
202. See Walker, supra note 3, at 330 ("Although Seligman was looking for a theory to
explain the process of exogenous depression when placing animals and people in the laboratory
and exposing them to random and variable aversive stimulation, he probably produced a
laboratory version of PTSD [post traumatic stress disorder]. Sometimes the participants'
behavioral responses made a difference to what happened while other times they did not. This
created the condition of non-contingency between response and outcome which then taught the
participants not to trust in their own natural responses when under threat of danger.").
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Just as the occurrence of learned helplessness is caused by the batterer's
abuse, which in turn limits his victim's options in responding to the situation,
many of the practical concerns addressed in the preceding paragraph are not
available because of the actions of the batterer. It was Mr. Norman's pursuit
of his wife when she tried to get out of the situation that made flight a
precarious option. 0 3 Mr. Norman actively interfered with his wife's efforts
to seek help from outside agencies.20" He further interfered with paramedics
0 5 Mr.
rendering assistance to Mrs. Norman after she took a bottle of pills.
Norman, in fact, inflicted additional abuse upon his wife when she made these
attempts.2 °6 It was Mr. Norman's actions that eliminated many of the other
options which may have been available. Thus, much like a traditional attacker
who leaves his intended victim no option other than deadly force because
there is no time for anything else,20 7 Mr. Norman created the situation where
his wife's only option was to kill him. In other words, it was his fault.
D. FAULT AND NECESSITY

Some may fear that allowing juries to consider self-defense claims in
terms of necessity rather than imminence will give people a license to kill
whenever self-preservation is at issue. If imminence is removed from the
equation, would not Dudley and Stephens"8 come out differently? To believe
that it would is to ignore the principle of fault. Fault, as much as necessity
and proportionality, is one of the fundamental underpinnings of self-defense
doctrine. 2" The condition that a defendant relying on a claim of self-defense
must not have been the aggressor in the conflict 210 recognizes this principle.
In assessing a self-defense claim, it is essential that the necessity of the
response arise from the actions of the attacker.' The result in Dudley would
not be changed by removing the imminence requirement from self-defense
203. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 1989).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 10.
206. Id. at 11.
207. This is the situation that the imminence requirement is designed to handle.
208. Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (This trial involved the
killing and eating of a compatriot by two sailors who had been afloat in a lifeboat for a
considerable period of time. The court held that self-preservation was not the same thing as
self-defense and that the killing was unjustified).
209. Rosen, supra note 14, at 378.
210. DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 199; see supra pp. X regarding aggressors.
211. This principle was also implicit in the imminence requirement, for it is the attacker
who creates the imminent threat of harm. Because necessity does not implicitly entail fault in
the way that imminence does, it must be explicitly included in self-defense doctrine if
imminence is removed as a precondition.
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doctrine because the victim was not responsible for creating the situation that
arguably made eating him necessary.
Ha v. Alaska exemplifies the relationship between fault and necessity.212
Ha was a Vietnamese immigrant who killed Buu, another immigrant, after Buu
had severely beaten and threatened to kill him the night before. 2 3 The next
morning, Ha waited for Buu for an hour and a half and shot him in the back
seven times. 214 The trial court rejected a requested self-defense instruction
because at the time Ha acted, he was faced by no imminent threat of harm.21 3
One of the theories Ha advanced was that he had no other option but to take
matters into his own hands because of a cultural distrust of the police.21 6
Eliminating the imminence requirement from self-defense would not change
the result in this case. Buu was not responsible for Ha's belief that going to
the police for protection would be futile. 2 7 The question of who is
responsible for limiting the defendant's options, if they are in fact limited,
distinguishes this case from that of Mrs. Norman. Mr. Norman, unlike Buu,
made it impossible for his victim to seek other avenues of protection.
CONCLUSION

Whether a killing was necessary is a question of fact. Eliminating the
imminence requirement from self-defense merely allows juries to realistically
consider, given the totality of the facts of any given situation, whether the use
of defensive force was necessary.2t8 Professor Rosen noted that "[u]sing a
the law
necessity rule instead of an imminence rule imports no new norms into
21 9
of self-defense; it merely changes the locus of decision making.,
Cases like Norman and Stewart220 provide strong evidence that a
defensive use of deadly force can be necessary despite the lack of an imminent
threat of harm. Imminence is only one way to measure necessity. Perhaps all
this comment has really demonstrated is the need for early and effective
intervention in these situations. Such intervention may eliminate the need for
lethal defensive action. Necessity, in these situations, arises in part from the
212. Ha v. Alaska, 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
213. Id. at 186.
214. Id. at 187.
215. Id. at 196.
216. Id. at 195.
217. Unless Ha pled some facts to support the notion that Buu was in some way
responsible for removing police protection as an option, denial of a self-defense instruction
would be appropriate.
218. Rosen, supra note 14, at 404.
219. Id.
220. See supra Part III.A.

218
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practical lack of alternatives. Until society is able to provide such alternatives
and protect a battered woman, we should not hold accountable one who has
been prompted to action, in part, by our own inaction. However even if we
find a way to intervene effectively in such situations, self-defense doctrine
will remain flawed unless we allow necessity, rather than imminence, to be the
primary consideration in assessing a use of defensive force.
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